Published on 08/11/23
Finland's approach to memory conflict centers on reconciling its past relations with Russia, marked by major conflicts in the 1930s. The Winter War (1939-1940) and the Continuation War (1941-1944) were significant encounters, causing heavy casualties on both sides. At the end of the Winter War, Finland ceded territory to the Soviet Union but attempted to regain it in the Continuation War, aligning with Germany's invasion of the USSR, which ended with the 'Moscow Armistice' in 1944.
These wars left a memory conflict between the nations. Finland lost significant territories inhabited by ethnic Finns. The memory of these wars, seen as Soviet aggression, is deeply ingrained in Finland's national memory. Over time, Finland adopted reconciliation policies to address the memory conflict. During the Cold War, it pursued a friendship policy with the Soviet Union, emphasizing friendly discussions and judicious settlements, as expressed by President Paasikivi in 1955. To reshape the historical narrative, Finland convicted 13 politicians, including wartime President Risto Ryti, as war criminals in trials from 1945 to 1946.
Despite these efforts, the memory of the Soviet-Finnish War lingered. However, the policy of reconciliation was generally supported by the masses, indicating a step towards overcoming the memory conflict. Following the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, a neo-patriotic turn occurred in Finland, stirring discussions about lost territories and rehabilitating convicted Finnish leaders. Nonetheless, official policies maintained a reconciliatory stance, facilitating border crossings, visiting old homes or battle sites, and promoting Finnish-Russian joint research projects on World War II.
In contrast, Ukraine has a more uncompromising approach towards memory conflict with Russia. Ukraine's history is intertwined with Russia, particularly during the severe famine in the 1930s. Ukraine claims it was a genocide engineered by Stalin's Soviet government, a narrative contradicted by Russia. The memory conflict deepened post-Ukraine's independence in 1991, and further escalated by Crimea's annexation in 2014.
Ukraine’s confrontational stance towards memory conflict is evident in its efforts to redefine historical narratives. In 2016, it established the Institute of National Memory to restore and preserve national memory, combating historical myths. The process of revisiting Soviet history became highly politicized, with a strict examination of textbooks to ensure compliance with the narrative of national patriotism.
The Second World War is a focal point in the memory war between Ukraine and Russia. In 2014, in response to a Russian law criminalizing distortion of the Soviet Union’s role in the war, Ukraine changed the anniversary marking the end of the war from May 9 to May 8, in line with other European countries. It also replaced the term ‘Great Patriotic War’ with ‘Second World War’, amplifying Soviet crimes and glorifying Ukrainian nationalist fighters.
Additionally, Ukraine embarked on a decommunization program in 2015, removing communist monuments and renaming public places. This law, while inciting Russian outrage, was seen by many Ukrainians as a step towards eradicating the state’s totalitarian legacy.
The contrasting approaches of Finland and Ukraine towards memory conflict are reflective of their desired national identities. Finland, aiming to act as a bridge between the East and the West, adopted reconciliation to maintain stability and economic benefits from its intermediary position. This approach helps in healing trans-generational trauma and aligning with Finland's neutral identity.
On the other hand, Ukraine, aiming to establish an independent identity leaning towards the West, adopted a confrontational stance. The government, amidst political instability and corruption, utilized this approach to mobilize nationalistic sentiments, often for political gains. However, this stance, while providing short-term political advantages, risks escalating tensions with Russia, as evidenced by the 2022 invasion.
Furthermore, the manipulation of historical narratives for political leverage highlights the intricacy of memory politics in influencing bilateral relations. The Finnish and Ukrainian cases demonstrate how different approaches to memory conflict, driven by underlying political agendas and national identity goals, significantly impact the nation's foreign relations and internal political dynamics.
References
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